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I. INTRODUCTION
A cursory examination of recent decisions reveals a truth which has
escaped neither judicial nor scholarly notice: "[t]he parental immunity defense
is anything but simple, and is certainly not an impenetrable shield."'
Recognition of the problems engendered by parental immunity, however, has
not lead to critical rectification of the doctrine. Legal commentators have failed
to squarely address the difficult questions raised by parental immunity, while
state and federal courts have neglected to consistently and adequately define the
doctrine's parameters. Needless to say, the confused landscape of parental
immunity is ripe for reform.
Through a comprehensive assessment of judicial opinions in various
jurisdictions, this Note seeks to establish a more clarified understanding of the
parental immunity doctrine as it exists today, and to further suggest the manner
in which the scope of that immunity may be most logically understood and
applied. Part II details the origin and historical development of the doctrine,
while Part M examines two recent decisions which manifest the difficulties
courts have encountered in applying the parental immunity defense. Finally,
Part IV describes a method for interpreting the scope of parental liability which
has been implicit in recent decisions but nonetheless obscured in the dialogue
between supporters and detractors of the doctrine.
I. THE ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARENT-
CHILD IMMUNITY DOCmN
A. From Common Law to Judicial Intervention
Despite retention of custody by parents, the child was a distinct and
separate legal entity at common law.2 Evidence of this fact is found in cases
where the child was "entitled to the benefits of his own property and to the
enforcement of his own choses in action including those in tort."3 The retention
1 Mary J. Long & Davidson Ream, Parent-Child Tort Inmnity, FOR THE DEFENSE
Jan. 1990 at 1, 23. Other commentators agree that "[t]he cases have not yet drawn a clear
picture of parental liability." W. PAGE KEErON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAw OF TORTs § 122 at 908 (5th ed. 1984).
2 KEErON Er AL., supra note 1, at 904.
3 RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. a (1979); see, e.g., Alston v.
Alston, 34 Ala. 15 (1859); Crowley v. Crowley, 56 A. 190 (N.H. 1903).
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of custody by parents over their unemancipated children, 4 however, was not
without consequence. As parents were charged with the duty of rearing and
disciplining their children, it was traditionally recognized that a parent had the
right to inflict bodily injury (within the sphere of non-criminal behavior) and
was therefore privileged. 5 It was within the scope of this privilege that the
doctrine of parental immunity arose, whereby a child was prohibited from
maintaining an action in tort against his or her parent.6
In a series of cases commonly referred to as the "great trilogy," 7 American
courts established the role of immunity in tort actions between parent and child.
The first decision recognizing parental immunity was reached in Hewliette v.
George.8 In HewIlette, the court found a parent who had wrongfully committed
her child to an asylum for the mentally insane immune from suit.9 Enunciating
what would come to be one of the most widely cited justifications for parental
immunity, 10 the court stressed a concern for the preservation of familial
4 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
[S]ince most of the justifications advanced for the immunity have concerned the relation
of a parent and his minor child who is under his custody and control and for whose
support he is responsible, it was held almost from the beginning that the immunity did
not apply to adult children or to minor children who had been emancipated by the
surrender of the right to their services and earnings and of parental control over them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G, cmt. d (1979).
5 William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in a Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 1030, 1059 (1930).
6 The parent-child immunity rule has also been generally recognized as prohibiting
actions in tort by parents against their children. See, e.g., Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 533
A.2d 1311, 1312 (Md. 1987) (citing Latz v. Latz, 272 A.2d 435 (Md. 1971)). The scope of
this Note, however, concerns only actions brought by unemancipated minors against their
parents.
A recent development in the sphere of parental immunity involved the consideration of
whether a child could maintain a cause of action against her mother for unintentionally
inflicted prenatal injuries. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988). While'
the Stallman court declined to impose liability on the mother in light of the parental
immunity doctrine, the issue of fetal rights has continued to be an expanding and hotly
debated area of law. For a detailed discussion of the Stallman decision, see Kathryn S.
Banashek, Comment, Stallman v. Youngquist, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 189 (1989). For a more
comprehensive discussion of fetal rights, see Note, Medical Technology & the Law: State
Intervention during Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1556 (1988).
7 Edwin D. Akers & William H. Drummond, Tort Actions Between Members of the
Family-Husband and Wife-Parent and Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 182 (1961).
8 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).
9 1d.
10 The preservation of domestic tranquility has remained an important justification
cited by courts upholding the parental immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Davis v. Grinspoon,
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harmony, which could only be jeopardized by permitting a child to maintain
such an action. 11
The decision to recognize parental immunity in Hewlette was soon
followed by McIlevey v. Mc~levey. 12 In McIlevey, the court provided an
additional justification for shielding parents from liability by way of an analogy
with interspousal immunity; just as a wife was to obey her husband, so a child
was subject to parental control and charged with a subsequent duty of
obedience owing to the parent. 13 Accordingly, the McIlevey court refused to
sustain an action by the child against the parent for cruel and inhumane
punishment.
14
The final case comprising the trilogy was Roller v. Roller.15 In that
decision, the court extended the concept of parental immunity to its conceivable
limits by barring a daughter's action against her father for rape. 16 Further
570 N.E.2d 1242 (111. 1991); Schlessinger v. Schlessinger By and Through Schlessinger,
796 P.2d 1385 (Colo. 1990).
Other courts, however, have argued that where a child has suffered injury due directly
or indirectly to the actions of the parent, the harmony between family members has already
been disrupted. Thus, a concern for the continued preservation of that harmony is an
insufficient rationale for finding parental immunity as a bar to the child's action. See Hurst
v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1989). In an analogous fashion courts have permitted
actions by children whose custodial relationships with the parties responsible for the
children's injuries have ceased to exist. In such instances the courts have reasoned that like
the relationship itself, the very notion of domestic tranquility has been terminated. See
Newsome v. Department of Human Resources, 405 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1991) (where foster
parents no longer stood in loco parentis at time action was filed, harmony justification for
parental immunity no longer applied); Johnson v. Meyers, 277 N.E.2d 778 (111. 1972) (child
permitted to bring action against deceased parent's estate as relationship and harmony
between child and parent had ceased to exist).
I IHewlette, 9 So. at 886.
12 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
13 Id. at 665. The notion of analogizing parental immunity with interspousal immunity,
however, has been the subject of some criticism. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 895G, cmt. c (1979) (the analogy of interspousal immunity is inapplicable to the immunity
existing between parent and child because of the difference in the original common-law
concept of relations); see also Scott T. Schreiber, Note, 77w Unsupervised adid: Parental
Negligence or Necessity?, 15 VAL. U.L. REV. 167, 174 (1980) (analogy inapposite as
child's identity was not merged with parent as were identities of husband and wife at
common law). Accordingly, while courts have continued to support the parental immunity
doctrine with an emphasis on the necessity of parental control and authority over children,
they have refrained from relying upon the concept of interspousal immunity.
14 McKlevey, 77 S.W. at 664, 665.
15 79 P. 788 (1905).
16 Id. A recent decision with facts reminiscent of those in Roller may be found in
Barnes v. Barnes, 566 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. 1991) (discussed in detail infra, part III).
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considerations advanced by the Roller court in favor of a rule of parental
immunity were (1) preventing the parent's potential reacquisition of the child's
tort damages through intestate succession, in the event the child predeceased
the parent, and (2) preserving the family exchequer (i.e., funds for the entire
family's life necessities) from depletion via damages collected in a judgment
against the parents.1 7
1. Expansion of the Parental Immunity Doctrine
Subsequent to the "great trilogy," expansion of parental immunity
continued in terms of the doctrine's scope, the rationales supporting its
existence, and the variety of contexts in which it was applied. One emergent
justification for the doctrine was the prevention of fraud and collusion which
courts feared would be perpetrated by family members at the expense of
liability insurers.' 8 The express concern of courts advancing this justification
was that permitting a minor child to sue his or her parents would not only
make such collusive efforts possible, but actually encourage that fraudulent
practice. 19 Currently, however, the fear of collusion is being widely assailed as
an insufficient rationale for maintaining parental immunity.20 As a corollary to
this critical approach assumed by the courts, children sustaining injuries have
Surprisingly enough, the conclusion in Barnes is virtually indistinguishable from that
reached by the Roller court.17 Roller, 79 P. at 788-89. Further support for the decision in Roller was presented in
Bulloch v. Bulloch, 163 S.E. 708 (1932) (parental immunity rule justified so as to preserve
family exchequer), and at least one recent decision, Schlessinger v. Schlessinger By and
Through Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 1385 (Colo. 1990), has cited the necessity of preventing
depletion of family assets as a continuing justification for parental immunity. But see
KEFErON Er AL, supra note 1, at 905 (concern for preservation of the family exchequer
does not outweigh the desirability of compensating the injured child). In Sneed v. Sneed,
705 S.W.2d 392 (Trex. 1986), the court permitted a child to sue his deceased parent's estate.
In doing so, the court noted "it is hard to understand why a child may not be compensated
for an injury by his parent while a stranger will be allowed to deplete the 'family exchequer'
to the detriment of the tortfeasor's children." Id. at 397.
18 See Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Parks v. Parks, 135 A.2d
65 (Pa. 1957). A recent decision citing the prevention of fraud and collusion between family
members as a viable rationale for maintaining the parental immunity defense may be found
in Davis v. Grinspoon, 570 N.E.2d 1242 (1. 1990).
19 Davis v. Grinspoon, 570 N.E.2d 1242 (111. 1990).
2 0 See Unah By and Through Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Okla. 1984). The
court found that the effectiveness of the jury system would ensure protection of liability
insurers from fraudulent claims. See also Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984).
In that decision the court held: "The deterrent effect of a perjury charge, extensive and
detailed pretrial discovery procedures, the opportunity for cross-examination and the
avoidability of summary judgment motions are but a few examples of the tools available to
our judicial system in exposing fraudulent claims in any lawsuit." Id. at 278.
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been permitted to sue their parents for recovery up to the limits of any existing
liability insurance.21
Another significant issue courts have dealt with in the sphere of parental
immunity has involved determining which parties are entitled to claim the
doctrine as a defense. A crucial development has been expanding the doctrine
to protect those standing in loco parentis to the child.22 One decision
supporting the application of the doctrine to those in loco parentis was reached
in Gunn v. Rollings.23 In Gunn the court reasoned that where one is in loco
parentis, the rights, duties, and liabilities of such a person are the same as
those of a natural parent, and that such a person is bound for the maintenance,
care, and education of the child so long as the relationship exists. 24
Accordingly, such individuals are equitably entitled to the same rights and
protections afforded to natural parents.2 Far from being established as a
steadfast rule, though, immunity for those in loco parentis has been qualified in
a number of recent decisions.26 Courts also remain divided on the issue of
21 In such instances, courts have reasoned that the real defendant in the action is not
the parent at all but in fact the liability insurer. Accordingly, children are permitted to sue
their parents as a means of realizing compensation from the insurer. See Martin, 676 P.2d
at 1370 ("We hereby qualify the rule of parental immunity in this jurisdiction to allow an
action for negligence arising from an automobile accident brought on behalf of an
unemancipated minor child against a parent to the extent of the parent's automobile liability
insurance."); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Yates v. Lowe, 348 S.E.2d 113
(Ga. 1986).
22 See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 390 S.E.2d 276 (Ga. 1990) (parental immunity
applies for grandparents standing in loco parentis); Lawber v. Doil, 547 N.E.2d 752 (111.
1989) (stepfather who stood in loco parentis entitled to parental immunity); Brown v.
Phillips, 342 S.E.2d 786 (Ga. 1986) (immunity exists for foster parents who were in loco
parentis).
23 157 S.E.2d 590 (S.C. 1967).
24 Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated
Child Caused by Parent's Negligence-Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.4TH 1066, 1090 (1989).
25 See supra notes 23 and 24 and accompanying text.
26 See Newsome v. Department of Human Resources, 405 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1991)
(foster parents prohibited from asserting defense of parental immunity where injured
children had been removed and placed with another foster family at time action was filed);
Mayberry v. Pryor, 374 N.W.2d 683 (Mich. 1985) (foster parents who accepted child
placements from state have no immunity); Andrews v. County of Otsega, 446 N.Y.S.2d
169 (1982) (foster parents were merely contract service providers assuming contractual duty
to provide supervisory care, and thus held responsible for failure to use reasonable care);
Gulledge v. Gulledge, 367 N.E.2d 429 (111. 1977) (parental immunity not extended to
include those having temporary control and custody of a minor, such as grandparents or
others). But see Vincent S. Nadile, Note, Promoting the Integrity of Foster Family
Relationships: Needed Statutory Protections for Foster Parents, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
221 (1987) (recommending state funded liability insurance to protect foster parents from
liability for negligent acts).
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whether parental immunity stands as a bar to actions brought by unemancipated
minor children against non-custodial parents, 27 or whether parents and children
acting within the scope of their mutual employment have transcended the
established boundaries of the parent-child relationship to the extent that
application of parental immunity is no longer justified. 28
Frequently, parties outside the familial domain subject to a child's personal
injury action will seek to join the child's parents as third-party defendants. 29 A
27 Courts which have found that parental immunity may not serve as a defense for
noncustodial parents have noted that where a parent lacks custody, he or she also lacks the
established position of control and authority which justifies the imposition of immunity.
Accordingly, the doctrine is not a procedural bar to the child's action as no purpose is
served in maintaining that bar. See Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711 (Ind. 1982); Turner
v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981).
Yet, other courts have reasoned that lack of custody does not alter the fundamental
parent-child relationship to the extent that the purpose served in maintaining the parental
immunity defense is illusory. See Smith v. Gross, 571 A.2d 1219 (Md., 1990) (parental
immunity doctrine applicable to children born out of wedlock and not within custody of
alleged negligent parent); Edgington v. Edgington, 549 N.E.2d 942 (il. 1990) (father
lacking custody of minor children not liable for injuries sustained in accident where he was
operating motor vehicle).
28 In the landmark decision of Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971),
the Supreme Court of Texas permitted a 14-year-old unemancipated minor to sue for
injuries sustained while in the employ of a farming partnership in which his father was a
partner. The court reasoned that the relationship between the father as partner and the son
as employee was indistinguishable from that of any other employment relationship, and that
in the absence of the special parent-child relationship the application of immunity would not
be justified. Id. at 932-33. A contrary result was reached in Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 533
A.2d 1311 (Md. 1987), in which the court held that a child's action against his father's
business partnership for injuries sustained in the operation of the partnership business was
barred by the doctrine of parental immunity. In refusing to permit the injured child to
maintain his action against the partnership, the Hatzinicolas court reasoned that "appellants
would be able to do indirectly what they could not do directly, that is, obtain damages in
their suit against appellee that in the end would be payable in part by the injured child's
father. That result would be inconsistent with the rationale of the parent-child immunity
doctrine." Id. at 1313.
29 Defendants seeking contribution from parents as third-party defendants often allege
that in breaching a duty owed to their own children, parents stand as joint tortfeasors
equally responsible for the injuries the child has sustained. In Parsons v. Wham-O, Inc.,
541 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1989), a child injured on a water slide manufactured by defendants
sought recovery against them for her injuries. Defendants subsequently sought to bring a
third-party action for contribution against the parents, alleging that the parents' failure to
properly instruct their child on the use of the water slide constituted actionable negligence.
The New York court, however, found that the parents' failure to properly instruct their
child constituted only negligent parental supervision, which does not create a cause of action
in that jurisdiction based on the decision reached in Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338
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number of courts have refused to sustain such claims, however, citing parental
immunity as a bar to the third-party actions instituted by defendants.30
2. Defining the Scope of Parental Immunity
Perhaps the most critical issue to be resolved in the sphere of parental
immunity involves defining the doctrine's scope. Central to the debate is the
manner in which the delicate balance between the autonomous parent-child
relationship31 and the right of an injured child to receive compensation for his
or her injuries32 should be achieved. While contemporary courts have refrained
from either completely abrogating the doctrine or, conversely, maintaining the
(N.Y. 1974). Thus, the court refused to permit defendants to maintain their third-party
claim against the parents.
30 See Parsons v. Wham-O, Inc., 541 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1989); Brunner v. Hutchinson
Div., Lear-Siegler, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 517 (W.D.S.D. 1991); Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d
682 (Del. 1979). But see Walker v. Milton, 268 So. 2d 654 (La. 1972) (contribution
permitted in favor of defendant against parent whose negligence had contributed to child's
injuries).
31 In Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1981), the court cogently described the
imperative of a relatively autonomous parent-child relationship in a democratic society:
There are certain areas of activities within the family sphere involving parental
discipline, care, and control that should and must remain free from judicial intrusion.
Parents should be free to determine how much the physical, moral, emotional, and
intellectual growth of their children can best be promoted. That is both their duty and
their privilege. Indeed, every parent has a unique philosophy of the rearing of children.
That philosophy is an outgrowth of the parent's own economic, educational, cultural,
ethical, and religious background, all of which affect the parent's judgment on how his
or her children should be prepared for the responsibilities of adulthood. Such
philosophical considerations come directly to the fore in matters of parental
supervision....
The parent is clearly in the best position to know the limitations and capabilities of
his or her own children. These intangibles cannot be adequately conveyed within the
normal atmosphere of a courtroom. Nor do we believe that a court or a jury can
evaluate these highly subjective factors without somehow supplanting the parent's own
individual philosophy.
Id. at 1152.
32 In discussing the right of injured children to pursue an action against their father for
injuries sustained in an accident precipitated by the alleged negligence of the father in
operating a motor vehicle, Justice Mauzy of the Supreme Court of Texas noted that "[tlo
allow a recovery here to all relatives, friends or acquaintances, but not to the driver's own
children, would be a denial of the children's right to legal redress." Jilani v. Jilani, 767
S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. 1988) (Mauzy, J. concurring).
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parental immunity as an absolute defense, the ground between these two
extremes remains fraught with complications and uncertainties.
One line of cases has established that immunity no longer exists where the
parent's negligence constitutes a breach of a duty thought to be owed to the
world at large. 33 Essentially, courts have reasoned that where the act is one of
general negligence beyond the privileged boundaries of the parent-child
relationship, deference to parental control and authority (and the immunity
which is the product of such deference) is no longer justified.34 Circumstances
involving injuries to children as a result of their unsupervised or negligent use
of dangerous instrumentalities have also provided grounds for courts piercing
the shield of parental immunity. 35 Finally, courts have permitted children to
maintain actions against their parents for willfully reckless conduct36 or
intentionally tortious actions, particularly in instances of physical or sexual
abuse.37
33 See, e.g., Grivas v. Grivas, 496 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1979) (parental liability for child's
injury premised on violation of duty owing to all, i.e., operation of lawn mower with
reasonable care); Cummings v. Jackson, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (1l. 1978) (violation of
ordinance to trim trees by parents resulted in liability when child struck by third-party
operating motor vehicle).
34 In the decision of Goedkoop v. Ward Pavement Corp., 378 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1976),
an infant child was injured upon tampering with explosive caps negligently maintained by
his father. The explosives had originally been obtained by the child from a construction site
and subsequently confiscated from the child's possession by the father. When the injured
child sued the construction company, the court permitted a third-party claim by the
defendant on the grounds that the father's negligent maintenance of the explosives was a
violation of a duty owed to all and not one deriving specifically from the traditional parent-
child relationship.
Similarly, an Arizona court concluded in the decision of Schleier for Alter v. Alter,
767 P.2d 1187 (Ariz. 1989), that parents could be liable for a dog bite injury sustained by
their child when the failure to properly control the animal was a violation of a duty owed to
the world at large.
35 See, e.g., Aquaviva v. Piazzolla, 458 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1982) (parental liability
imposed on parents for failure to protect their infant child from injury resulting from an
older son's unauthorized control of the family's motor vehicle, when harm resulted from a
foreseeable abuse of a dangerous instrumentality by that older child); Nolechek v. Gesuale,
385 N.E.2d 1268 (N.Y. 1978) (third-party action permitted against parent where injury to
child resulted from negligent entrustment by parent of dangerous instrumentality to child).
36 See Hoffman v. Tracy, 406 P.2d 323 (Wash. 1965) (parental liability exists for
injury sustained by child resulting from parent's operation of motor vehicle while
intoxicated).
37 See Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1989); Wilson by Wilson v. Wilson,
742 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1984).
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In New York, a number of decisions (beginning with the court's opinion in
Holodook v. Spencer38) have established that allegations of conduct considered
to be negligent supervision on the part of a parent are not actionable. 39 In
accordance with the rationale set forth in Holodook,40 the New York courts
have placed primary emphasis on the belief that supervision of unemancipated
minor children is both inherent to and definitive of the family relationship.
Thus, the bar that parental immunity poses for actions sounding in negligent
supervision derives from the reluctance of the judiciary in New York to
interfere with parental duty and privilege. 41
Despite the multitude of divergent and seemingly irreconcilable approaches
the courts have adopted with respect to parental immunity, two distinct
interpretations of the doctrine have been favored by courts in recent years. The
first was established by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the 1963 decision of
(-oller v. White.42 In that opinion, the court held that the parental immunity
doctrine would be abrogated in negligence cases except where the alleged
negligent act involved an exercise of (1) parental authority over the child or (2)
ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing,
housing, medical and dental services, or other care.43 Implicit in the court's
reasoning was a belief that deference to parental authority and discretion was
justified only in limited contexts, i.e., the relatively traditional roles assumed
by parents as guardians and providers of care. Accordingly, subsequent
decisions employing reasoning analogous to that of Goller have established that
the privilege of immunity for parents remains circumscribed by a judicial
determination of whether or not the alleged negligent conduct transpired within
the traditional boundaries of parental authority or care.44 It is noteworthy,
38 324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974). Consolidated with Holodook were two other cases
involving instances of negligent supervision: Ryan v. Fahey, 352 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1974), and
Graney v. Graney, 350 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1973).
39 See, e.g., Pravato v. Pravato, 571 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1991) (action premised on
negligent supervision not actionable under New York law); Parsons v. Wham-O, Inc., 541
N.Y.S.2d 44 (1989) (parent's failure to properly instruct child on use of water slide was
negligent supervision not actionable in a third-party claim for contribution).
4 0 Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 343.
41 For a thorough discussion of Holodook and similar cases, see Schreiber, supra note
13.
42 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
43 Id.
44 In Mancinelli v. Crosby, 589 A.2d 664 (N.J. 1991), the court determined that acts
of willful or wanton supervisory misconduct were not protected by parental immunity. In
reaching its conclusion, the court engaged in the following four-part analysis: (1) Could a
finder of fact determine that the alleged negligent acts or omissions by the parent were a
proximate cause of the child's injuries? (2) If "yes," did the act or omission come within the
protected spheres of parental authority or the provision of customary child care, such that
immunity would be afforded as a defense to the parent? (3) If the conduct was protected,
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though, that the assignment of this function to the judiciary has failed to yield a
uniform interpretation as to what types of conduct constitute exercises of
parental authority or customary child care. Consequently, ambiguity and what
are arguably overly restrictive applications of the Goller standard have
resulted. 45
Dissatisfaction with the Goller decision became evident in the California
Supreme Court's decision in Gibson v. Gibson.46 First, the court argued that
adherence to the standard set forth in Goller would "inevitably result in the
drawing of arbitrary distinctions about when particular parental conduct falls
within or without the immunity guidelines." 47 As noted supra,48 such arbitrary
distinctions seem to be an inevitable result of assigning courts the task of
determining what type of conduct is actually protected. Second, the Gibson
court found "intolerable the notion that if a parent can succeed in bringing
himself within the 'safety' of parental immunity, he may act negligently with
impunity." 49 The court recognized that "although a parent has the prerogative
and the duty to exercise authority over his minor child, this prerogative must
be exercised within reasonable limits." 50 Consequently, the Gibson court
did it constitute a lack of parental supervision? (4) If "yes," could a trier of fact determine
that the lack of parental supervision amounted to willful or wanton supervisory misconduct?
If so, immunity would not be afforded to the parent. Id. at 666 (citing Murray by Olsen v.
Shimolla, 555 A.2d 24 (N.J. 1989)).
In Ashley v. Bronson, 473 N.W.2d 757 (Mich. 1991), the court determined that a
father's decision to build a pool was an exercise of reasonable parental discretion regarding
the provision of housing for his family. Accordingly, the father would be immune from suit
brought on behalf of a deceased child who drowned in the pool, because Michigan
recognizes an exception to the abrogation of parental immunity for alleged negligent acts
involving the exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect to the provision of
food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care (citing Plumley v.
Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972)).
45 In Schmidt v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Wis. 1974), for instance, the
court determined that parents could be held liable for injuries sustained by their children as
a result of an accident caused by the alleged negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the
parent when driving the children home from high school. In reaching this conclusion, the
court found that the operation of a motor vehicle was not "other care" under the Goller
standard, nor otherwise within the scope of everyday acts of upbringing.
Similarly, in Horn v. Horn, 630 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1982), the court sustained an action
by a child against his parent for injuries the boy sustained while riding a trail bike alongside
his father. The court held that the father was not entitled to parental immunity because the
activity did not involve disciplining the child, nor an exercise of discretion in providing care
and necessities which he as a parent was legally obligated to furnish.
46 479 P.2d 648 (Ca. 1971) (en banc).
47 Id. at 653.
48 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
49 479 P.2d at 653.
50 Id.
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formulated a standard that would assess parental conduct on the basis of what
"an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent [would] have done in similar
circumstances." 51 In accordance with the Gibson standard, acts or omissions
that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent in similar circumstances would
have committed are protected by parental immunity, while acts which fail to
satisfy this standard may render the parent subject to liability. 52 Commentators
and other legal authorities have praised the reasonably prudent parent standard
as one promising to assist the courts in achieving the desired balance between
autonomy and equity in the parent-child relationship. 53
Ill. EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY IN
RECENT DECISIONS: BARNES AND JILANI
Contemporary courts concur in the belief that parental immunity is neither
an absolute shield to liability nor a completely antiquated defense best left to
the annals of American legal history. Regrettably, however, general agreement
on this assertion and even the widespread adoption by courts of the Goller and
Gibson standards have failed to produce a relatively consistent and coherent
understanding of parental immunity. While divergent interpretations of parental
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., Tabor v. Doctors Memorial Hosp., 563 So. 2d 233 (La. 1990); Convery
v. Maczka, 394 A.2d 1250 (N.J. 1978).
In the sphere of governmental immunity, courts have drawn a distinction between
discretionary decisions and their subsequent execution. Thus, it has been generally
understood that liability may not be imposed for "the making of a basic policy decision
which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion."
Reynolds v. State, 471 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ohio 1984). However, "once the decision has
been made to engage in a certain activity or function," courts recognize that "the state may
be held liable.., for the negligence of the actions of its employees and agents in the
performance of such activities." Id. While the logic of such a distinction may be persuasive,
courts invoking the types of categoric immunity described in Goller have not engaged in a
similar type of analysis. Rather, decisions like Convery reflect a general concurrence among
jurisdictions that in traditional areas like discipline or the provision of medical care, parental
immunity exists for both the discretionary choice and the consequences of its execution.
53 The Restatement (Second) of Torts notes that with respect to the day-to-day parental
activities of authority and supervisory conduct, "[p]arental discretion is involved, and to say
that the standard of a reasonable prudent parent is applied should be to recognize the
existence of that discretion and thus to require that the conduct be palpably unreasonable in
order to impose liability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G, cmt. k at 431
(1979). The Restatement goes on to state that the reasonable prudent parent standard "seems
more appropriate than the granting of a categoric immunity for these types of activities,
regardless of the blatancy of the negligence or the willfulness of the conduct." Id.
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immunity are due no doubt in part to distinct precedents and legislative action 54
established among the various state and federal jurisdictions, the single greatest
source of ambiguity and confusion with respect to the doctrine seems to be a
fundamental disagreement on its scope. An examination of two relatively recent
decisions makes manifest the complications courts have encountered in defining
the scope of parental immunity.
A. The Jilani Decision
In Jilani v. Jilani,55 the Supreme Court of Texas was asked to rule whether
parental immunity could serve as a defense to an action premised on a parent's
alleged negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 56 The action was brought on
behalf of three unemancipated minor children by their mother for injuries the
children sustained in a motor vehicle accident caused by the alleged negligence
of the driver, the children's father.57 Citing precedental authority, the Jilani
court went on to consider whether the facts of the case sub judice fell within
the sphere of protected parental conduct, i.e., "alleged acts of ordinary
negligence which involve a reasonable exercise of parental authority or the
exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to provisions for the care
and necessities of the child." 58
The court's majority opinion, by Justice Spearg, noted that "[tihe familial
obligations and duties imposed by law and nature are quite different from the
general obligation the law imposes upon every driver of an automobile." 59
Accordingly, the court determined that parental immunity would not serve as a
defense in the case before it. Establishing that "immunity is limited to
transactions that are essentially parental," the court went on to find that "the
essence of the alleged negligence was the improper operation of a motor
54 Two states, Connecticut and North Carolina, have enacted legislation abrogating the
parental immunity defense in actions arising from motor vehicle accidents. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572c (West 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1989).
Similarly, an Indiana court found in the decision of Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711
(Ind. 1982), that Indiana Code section 9-3-3-1 (now codified in IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-
40-3 (West Supp. 1992)), would permit a child or stepchild to bring an action for injuries
sustained in a motor vehicle accident when the driver-parent's operation of the vehicle
constituted willful or wanton misconduct. See also Davidson v. Davidson, 558 N.E.2d 849
(Ind. 1990).
55 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 672 (citing Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 923, 933 (Tex. 1971)).
Consider that the standard for assessing protected parental conduct set forth in Felderhoff
does not differ substantially from the categorical immunity described in Goller. See supra
notes 42-45.
59 Jilani, 767 S.W.2d at 673.
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vehicle-an activity not essentially parental." 60 Though the court conceded that
the accident transpired while the family was on vacation, it nonetheless
determined that this fact was inconsequential in regard to the ultimate holding
of the case.61 Wary of the risk of "substituting judicial discretion for parental
discretion in the care and rearing of minor children," the court limited its
holding to the specific facts before it-"an automobile tort action brought by an
unemancipated minor child against a parent. "62
A concurring opinion by Justice Mauzy emphasized the existence of
liability insurance as a factor worthy of consideration for courts deciding
whether or not to extend parental immunity in a particular case.63 Specifically,
in instances where adequate coverage existed, there would be no disruption of
family harmony nor a danger of depleting the family funds, as the action was
essentially between the injured child and the parent's liability insurer.64 In
conclusion, the concurring opinion recommended legislation via a "direct
action" statute which would permit the injured party to pursue a direct action
against the tortfeasor's liability insurer. 65
Strong dissenting opinions written by Justices Cook and Gonzalez
criticized the court's narrow reading of the standard enunciated in Felderhoff.
Arguing that the majority opinion failed to give sufficient credence to the fact
that the Jilanis were in fact on a recreation trip when the accident occurred,
Justice Cook noted that "Felderhoff specifically enumerated 'the provision of a
home, food, schooling, family chores, medical care, and recreation' as within
the scope of parental discretion."66 Similarly, Justice Gonzalez emphasized that
given the facts before the court, "[tlhe operative fact is not that the injury
occurred in an automobile, but that the family was on vacation."67 Both
dissenting Justices agreed further in their belief that permitting unemancipated
minor children to sue a parent would unnecessarily disrupt the domestic
harmony and order crucial to family life.68 Reflection on the departing views of
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 674 (Mauzy, I., concurring).
6 4 Id at 674-75.
65 Id. at 675-76. For a further, favorable discussion of Justice Mauzy's
recommendation for a direct action statute, see Chanse McLeod, Note, Jilani v. Jilani: The
Erosion of the Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine in Texas, 28 Hous. L. REv. 717 (1991).
66 Jilani, 767 S.W.2d at 677 (Cook, J., dissenting) (citing Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d at
933).67 Id. at 678 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
68 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cook asserted:
The relationship between a parent and child is unique. It involves elements of love,
trust, confidence, and independence that must be exercised continuously by parents in
carrying out their demanding and burdensome duties. Parents are the primary role
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the majority and dissenters in Jilani serves no doubt to illustrate the
complications encountered by courts attempting to define the parameters of the
parental immunity doctrine.
B. The Barnes Decision
Further evidence of the difficulties courts have had in applying the concept
of parental immunity is found in the decision of Barnes v. Barnes.69 In Barnes,
a daughter sought compensation for rape and assault suffered at the hands of
her father when she was fifteen. 70 On appeal from the trial court's decision
awarding the daughter $3,250,000 in compensatory and punitive damages, the
father sought to have the decision reversed on the grounds of parental
immunity. 71 The first issue demanding resolution in Barnes was whether the
"de facto" marital separation of the parents at the time of the alleged
occurrence deprived the father from claiming the parental immunity defense.72
Finding a prior decision which denied divorced, non-custodial parents
immunity inapposite to the facts before it, the Barnes court reasoned that joint
custody by both parents over their daughter (by virtue of their marriage at the
time the incident transpired) permitted the father to maintain the defense on
appeal. 73
The second issue facing the Barnes court was whether the concept of
parental immunity itself had ceased to serve the needs of the family in modem
society. The court rejected the notion that the earlier decision of Buffalo v.
models for children. Children learn from what they see their parents do; a holding such
as this can only encourage and breed a more litigious society.
Id. at 677 (Cook, J., dissenting). In analogous fashion, Judge Gonzalez cited the following
language from Felderhoffwith approval:
Harmonious family relationships depend on filial and parental love and respect
which can neither be created nor preserved by legislatures or courts. The most we can
do is to prevent the judicial system from being used to disrupt the wide sphere of
reasonable discretion which is necessary in order for parents to properly exercise their
responsibility to provide nurture, care, and discipline for their children.
Id. at 679 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (citing Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d at 933).
69 566 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. 1991).
70 Id. at 1043.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1044.
73 Id. The court noted that the facts of the Barnes case were sufficiently distinct from
those found in Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711 (Ind. 1982), in which the lack of custody
over a minor child by a divorced parent negated the justifications (i.e., preservation of
domestic peace and tranquility) supporting application of the parental immunity rule.
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Buffalo, which recognized a statutory exception to parental immunity in
instances where a parent's operation of a motor vehicle constituted willful or
wanton misconduct, signaled a "legislative disapproval of parental immunity"
or otherwise indicated a judicial intolerance for that common-law defense.74 To
the contrary, the court cited precedent which "clearly contemplated suits based
on allegations such as those in this case-i.e., 'the ravishment of a minor
daughter by her father.'" 75 Though admitting the "disturbing" result of its
decision, (i.e., barring the daughter's suit on grounds of parental immunity),
the Barnes court nonetheless argued that "the wronged party is not without a
remedy," which in this instance would be "to cause the offender to forfeit
custody and be incarcerated under the criminal processes rather than allow the
victim to seek monetary compensation." 76 In its continued reliance on the
precedent of Smith v. Smith, the court reiterated the justification for its decision
as a "reluctance to disturb the fragile balance which maintains this important
institution" of the family.77 A seemingly apologetic conclusion found the court
74 566 N.E.2d at 1044-45. The court held that the legislative intent underlying Indiana
Code section 9-3-3-1 (now codified in IND. CODE ANN. § 34440-3 (West Supp. 1992))
was not indicative of any desire on the part of the Indiana Legislature to abolish parental
immunity.
75 Id. at 1045 (citing Smith v. Smith, 142 N.E. 128, 129 (Ind. 1924)).
76 Id. In supporting criminal prosecution as the sole and proper redress to the
grievances before it, the court argued the following:
The offender is thus removed from society, at least for a time, and the chances of
a repeat offense are considerably decreased. Moreover, as the father of the victim, the
child abuser or child molester still retains at least a partial responsibility to pay for the
psychological and medical treatment of the child which was necessitated by his deviant
conduct. Such was the case here, where John paid over $160,000 for Polly's
psychiatric care and institutionalization.
Id.
77 Id. Concurrence with the rationale cited by the Smith court in support of parental
immunity was evident in the following language:
From our knowledge of the social life of today, and the tendencies of the unrestrained
youth of this generation, there appears to be much reason for the continuance of
parental control during the child's minority, and that such control should not be
embarrassed by conferring upon the child a right to civil redress against the parent
under the circumstances stated in the question we are now considering. In our opinion,
much reason exists for maintaining the sound public policy, which, as stated, underlies
the rule which denies such redress. Extreme cases may arise, where it may seem harsh
to deny the right, but we are governed by recognized rules, which must be uniformly
applied. On the whole it seems far better to rely on the criminal law and the equity
powers of the court to protect the child, where parental affection fails, even if they
afford no redress for past wrongs, than to abandon the rule under consideration.
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conceding that although "denial of civil redress might seem harsh, we deem a
wholesale abolition of the parental immunity rule to be unwise, and we cannot
find that the interest of consistency is served by adjudicating suits between
parent and child on a case-by-case basis." 78
The "disturbing" ramifications of the majority's decision, reflected in the
opinion itself, suggest the troubling aspects of parental immunity with respect
to both the end reached in Barnes and the means by which that end was
achieved and justified. Judge Conover's dissenting opinion called into question
both the efficacy and the equity of a decision which barred a daughter's suit for
rape in order to preserve domestic peace and tranquility, as well as parental
authority and control.79 Primary emphasis was placed on the dissenting
justice's steadfast belief that "[i]mmunity from civil suit for the parent's
commission of sexual transgressions upon his children simply does not exist
under the mores of modem society." 80 Accordingly, abrogation of parental
immunity (particularly in instances of sexual battery) would accord with
Indiana's prior abrogation of interspousal immunity on the analogous grounds
that it, too, failed to adequately serve contemporary public interest.81 Finally,
the dissent argued that regardless of any persuasive rationales for abandoning
parental immunity, the facts here fell clearly within a recognized exception to
the parental immunity defense as an instance where the tortious parent lacked
custody.82
IV. THE PARENT AS DISCRETIONARY ACTOR: REDEFINING THE SCOPE
OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY
The judicially created concept of parental immunity has engendered a wide
range of discussion on a number of issues: What are the proper justifications
which both permit and necessitate the existence of parental immunity? Are only
parents entitled to claim the defense of immunity in response to actions
premised on negligent or otherwise tortious conduct causing injury to
unemancipated minors? What impact should the existence of liability insurance
have on the parents' entitlement to the immunity defense? While these issues
(and others) remain present for resolution in the current dialogue, the crux of
the debate surrounding parental immunity continues to involve a determination
of the proper scope of that defense.
Id. (citing Smith, 142 N.E.2d at 129).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1046 (Conover, J., dissenting).
80 Id.
81 Id. (citing Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972)).
82 Id. at 1047 (Conover, J., dissenting).
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To be sure, discussion of the "scope" of parental immunity contemplates a
comprehensive use of that term such that it encompasses both the application of
the doctrine to a wide variety of contexts (e.g., are parents entitled to immunity
when transporting their children in an automobile?), as well as its application to
a wide variety of actors (e.g., are grandparents entitled to claim immunity in
instances where their negligent or otherwise tortious conduct has contributed to
the injury of their grandchildren?). Still, a comprehensive use of this term
conveniently permits one to focus on the two central questions enmeshed in the
current debate: To whom will parental immunity be extended, and to what
extent shall that immunity exist?
The Jilani and Barnes decisions provide grounds not only for examining
the factual scenarios in which claims to parental immunity are often asserted,
but also serve to illustrate the manner in which courts have attempted to define
the scope of parental immunity. Thus, the court in Jilani reasoned that on the
basis of jurisdictional precedent, parental immunity would not be extended to
instances of negligent operation of a motor vehicle since it did not involve "a
reasonable exercise of parental authority or the exercise of ordinary parental
discretion with respect to provisions for the care and necessities of the child."83
Eschewing the Gibson standard of assessing parental conduct in light of the
"ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent under similar circumstances," 84 the
Jilani court instead based its decision on a judicial determination of whether or
not the alleged negligent conduct transpired within the traditional boundaries of
parental authority or care.
In relative contrast to the Jilani decision, the discussion of parental
immunity by the Barnes court did not focus particularly on whether or not the
tortious actions of the father fell within a protected sphere of parental conduct.
After determining that "de facto" marital separation did not deprive the father
of the right to claim parental immunity, the court reasoned that immunity
should be extended in order to preserve domestic harmony. Thus, the court
concluded the proper remedy for the grievances before it was criminal
prosecution and not civil liability.85 It is significant, however, that the court's
decision implicitly defined the "scope" of parental immunity: determining first
that marriage and custody afforded the parental actor immunity, and second,
that acts of rape and physical abuse did not necessarily constitute conduct
beyond the parameters in which immunity would be granted.
In light of the opinions in Jilani and Barnes, and with reference to the
"reasonably prudent parent under similar circumstances" standard enunciated
in Gibson, a formidable task presents itself. Essentially, the task involves
formulating a more comprehensive standard for assessing the "scope" of
83 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
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parental conduct with respect to the traditional immunity provided therein.
Formulating such a standard would not constitute a departure from current law,
but rather contemplates an integration of the categoric immunities provided in
Goller86 with the "reasonably prudent parent under similar circumstances"
standard established in Gibson. While the paramount goal in formulating such a
standard is the establishment of an equitable balance between the autonomous
parent-child relationship and an injured child's right to legal redress, the more
immediate purpose served by such a standard would be to provide greater
certainty and clarity of understanding with respect to the application of parental
immunity.
The task of formulating such a standard is greatly enhanced through
reference to a recent work by Professor Philip C. Sorensen regarding the duty
of care exercised by corporate directors. 87 Though a cursory examination of
this work would seem to suggest its limited application in the instant context,
the immunity frequently afforded to corporate directors under the business
judgment rule is clearly analogous to the immunity afforded to parents under
the parental immunity doctrine. 88
Under the general concepts of ordinary negligence law, "choices regarding
conduct and risks which bear upon liability are assumed to be made by the
actor and victim independently and autonomously." 89 However, the traditional
understanding of the relationship between the parent and the unemancipated
minor child contemplates a situation where the authority to make choices
regarding conduct and risks is frequently wielded by a single actor-the parent.
In such circumstances, the parental actor is deemed to possess what Professor
Sorensen has termed "discretionary authority." 90 Accordingly, parental actors
who are granted such discretion enjoy "an authority to act on behalf of victims
or to define the circumstances of their actions [and] will possess, as a
consequence of that authority, the power to avoid liability." 91 The "dilemma"
engendered by granting parents discretionary authority, however, becomes
apparent in the numerous opinions where courts have attempted to define the
proper scope and duty of care owing from parent to child (i.e., the imposition
of liability for acts deemed "unreasonable" in a context where parents
86 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
87 Philip C. Sorensen, Discretion and its Limits-An Analytical Framvork for
Understanding and Applying the Duty of Care to Corporate Directors (and Others), 66
WASH. U. L.Q. 553 (1988).
88 "Mhe analytical framework produced offers a guide for formulating standards of
conduct in any situation where the actor, whether public or private, has a legitimate and
independent claim to authority over matters dispositive of liability." Id. at 557-58.
89 Id. at 555.
90 1d. at 556.
91 Id. at 564.
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themselves "decide what is or is not unreasonable" for their children). 92
Indeed, decisions such as Jilani, Gibson, and to a lesser extent Barnes embody
judicial standards-via categoric expressions of immunity or application of the
"reasonably prudent parent under similar circumstances"-which circumscribe
the rather subjective nature of parental discretion. While the current legal
standards remain both necessary and viable, this Note seeks primarily to
describe a manner in which the integration of these standards may produce a
more uniform and comprehensive understanding of parental immunity.
The task of formulating a more comprehensive standard for assessing
parental conduct is enhanced by a re-examination of the bases for judicial
deference to the parents' discretionary authority. As noted in Part 1-A,
supra,93 a number of rationales have been set forth by courts seeking to justify
the grant of parental immunity: maintenance of domestic tranquility, a concern
for preserving the family exchequer, and the prevention of fraud and collusion
feared to be perpetrated by family members on liability insurers. It is
noteworthy, however, that judicial deference to parental discretionary
authority, and the immunity that discretion affords, are most logically premised
on two grounds. The first ground involves the recognition that "there is no
source equal to or better than the actor [(i.e., parent)] to determine the
reasonableness or propriety of that conduct in the particular context. " 94 This
basis of judicial deference to a parent's discretionary authority is apparent in
decisions which acknowledge that "[t]he parent is clearly in the best position to
know the limitations and capabilities of his or her own children." 95 The second
ground for judicial deference to the discretionary authority of the parent arises
from an acknowledgement that the interests protected by legal duties under
ordinary negligence standards (i.e., the right to be compensated for harm
proximately caused by the negligent conduct of another) are necessarily
subordinated to the autonomous relationship which society recognizes as
existing between parent and child. 96
Recognizing the aforementioned grounds as the most logical and persuasive
bases for judicial deference to the discretionary authority of parents, it becomes
necessary to define the manner in which judicial limits may be imposed on the
discretionary authority of the parental actor. Again, it is by limiting the
discretionary authority of parents that the equitable balance between the
autonomous parent-child relationship and the child's right to legal redress for
his or her injuries may be most readily achieved. As suggested by Professor
Sorensen, defining the proper scope of the parent's discretionary authority
(which in turn defines the extent to which parental immunity is granted)
92 Id. at 562-63.
93 See supra notes 7-21 and accompanying text.
94 Sorensen, supra note 87, at 567.
95 Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145, 1152 (NJ. 1981).
96 Sorensen, supra note 87, at 569.
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involves the application of two tests. The first test establishes limits of context,
scope, and exercise on parental discretion. 97 The second test would involve a
measure of the parent's conduct against the standard of a reasonably prudent
parent under similar circumstances. 98
Contextual limits imposed on the parent (and others) are evident under
current law. For instance, courts have found that those standing in loco
parentis to the child merit the type of deference normally reserved for
parents. 99 Accordingly, a judicial assessment of whether or not an individual
was acting within the parental context would determine whether normal
standards of care or the type of deference which produces parental immunity
would be applied. Further application of the limits of context imposed on the
parent are evident in decisions which have considered whether or not parental
immunity applies to non-custodial parents or those interacting with their
children while in the scope of employment. 100
Limits of scope imposed on the parent as discretionary actor would derive
from a number of sources. Acceptance of the standards set forth in decisions
like Goller, as advocated by this Note, suggests that deference to the parent as
discretionary actor (and the immunity which that deference produces) is logical
97 Application of limits of context, scope and exercise to the discretionary actor
operates on the premise that within these defined boundaries, "[d]eference to... [the
parents'] discretionary authority forbids the application of normal standards of conduct, but
conduct beyond the limits of that authority has no such claim to deference." Id. at 582.
98 The second test applicable to the discretionary acts of a corporate director, that of
net economic, utility, is described by Professor Sorensen in the following manner:
(2) The conduct of the director would, to an ordinarily prudent director in a like
position and under similar circumstances, lack net economic utility to the corporation,
normally manifested by a situation where, as calculated at the time of the conduct in
question, the economic costs exceed economic benefits.
Id. at 580.
Formulation of a standard for assessing the discretion of the parental actor, however,
necessitates departure from the net economic utility test. While a cost-benefit analysis of
parental decision-making is not inconceivable, it is far more subjective, and thus difficult to
assess, than in the context of determining the economic utility of actions taken by a
corporate director. Indeed, the unique parent-child relationship is far less susceptible to the
type of scrutiny imposed on corporate directors, which generally proceeds through an
assessment of tangible economic factors such as production or loss of profit. Rather than
force the issue, it is suggested that parental conduct beyond the established discretionary
limits of context, scope, and exercise be assessed under a standard of the "reasonably
prudent parent under similar circumstances" and without specific reference to the notion of
net economic utility.
99 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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when the parental conduct at issue involves an exercise of (1) parental authority
over the child or (2) ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision
of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, or other care.101
Similarly, a finding that the conduct at issue involved an alleged act of
negligent parental supervision would not result in the abrogation of immunity,
accepting of course the notion that supervision is within the discretionary scope
of the parental actor. 102 Other sources from which limits on the scope of
parental discretion may be derived include standards of grossly negligent or
willfully reckless conduct as well as criminal prohibitions on intentionally
tortious actions like physical and sexual abuse. 10 3
Limits of exercise on discretionary authority are more readily applicable in
the realm of corporate directors, where issues of negligence frequently arise
with respect to the process of making business decisions. 10 4 Such limits,
however, are not wholly without value in assessing the conduct of the parental
actor. Consider, for instance, a father who decides to take his young son
hunting but fails to properly instruct the youth on safely handling the firearm.
Subsequently, the boy is injured when the gun discharges without the safety
latch on. Assume for the moment that hunting is accepted as a normal activity
in the parent-child relationship, such that deference to the discretionary
authority of the father is generally presumed. However, if it were found that
the father was negligent in deciding to take his son hunting (i.e., in failing to
adequately consider the boy's inexperience, weight, strength and other factors
influencing his capacity to properly control the rifle), then the presumption of
deference to the father's discretion would no longer apply.' 0 5 This would not
indicate, however, the automatic imposition of liability on the father. Rather,
his conduct would be further assessed under the second test of the "reasonably
prudent parent under similar circumstances" in order to determine if immunity
should be granted.
The second test suggested here contemplates departure from that proposed
by the author in Discretion and its Limits.'0 6 In the first respect, departure is
101 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
104 See Sorensen, supra note 87, at 586.
105 Failure to properly exercise parental authority, then, could result in liability despite
the fact that the decision itself (i.e., to have the unemancipated minor participate in hunting)
was one traditionally afforded immunity. In this way, the doctrine of parental immunity
would further reflect that of sovereign immunity, where protection is granted only for the
decision and not for its subsequent execution. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Similarly, one might analogize the potentially negligent actions of the father as
violations of a duty of ordinary care owing to the world at large. See supra notes 34-35 and
accompanying text.
106 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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symbolized by the reconceptualization of the test itself: instead of focusing on
the net economic utility of parental conduct toward the child, parental conduct
is to be assessed with reference to the standard of an "ordinarily reasonable and
prudent parent under similar circumstances." Furthermore, the second test
would not necessarily be applied conjunctively in all instances; rather, it would
be applied only in instances where parental conduct was found to have
breached discretionary limits of context, scope, or exercise. This departure is
justified not only by the unique status of the parent-child relationship, but also
by the jurisprudential standards and precedent which have shaped the concept
of parental immunity from its inception. Under the standard thus formulated,
parental conduct falling outside of the parents' discretionary authority may
produce liability, but only if it constitutes a breach of the standard of the
"ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent under similar circumstances." 10 7
A re-examination of the decisions in Jilani and Barnes provides an
opportunity for the practical application of this standard. In Jilani, for instance,
the majority opinion dictated that deference to the father as discretionary actor
would not be justified because the operation of a motor vehicle, even in the
context of a family recreational venture, was not within the limited scope of
parental conduct. While the dissenting justices in Jilani set forth persuasive
arguments to the contrary, it may be assumed arguendo that operation of a
motor vehicle is not within the scope of parental discretionary authority. Under
the standard described above, however, conduct beyond the limits of scope
would not necessarily imply the imposition of liability; rather, liability would
be imposed if the father was found to have breached the standard of the
ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent under like circumstances.
Consider as well an application of this standard to the facts presented in
Barnes. While the majority and dissenting opinions disagreed as to whether or
not "de facto" marital separation constituted an instance of the father acting
outside the context of parental discretion, it may again be assumed arguendo
that the limits of context were not transcended. In contrast to the majority
opinion, however, it would be arguable that violation of criminal statutes
prohibiting rape and assault in any context would constitute conduct beyond the
scope of the parent's discretionary authority. As the presumption of deference
to that authority would no longer apply, the father's conduct would
correspondingly be assessed with reference to the standard of the ordinarily
reasonable and prudent parent under similar circumstances. Accepting the
premise that such conduct would in any event breach that standard, it becomes
apparent that liability would be imposed.
107 This model for assessing parental conduct, despite the aforementioned departures,
would thus reflect the principles applied by Professor Sorensen: "Conduct that does fall
outside the directors' discretionary authority can produce liability, but only if it lacks net
economic utility to the corporation." Sorensen, supra note 87, at 589.
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V. CONCLUSION
Recent opinions invoking parental immunity have focused on a variety of
elements pertinent to that doctrine's application. A review of these decisions,
however, fails to yield a comprehensive and clarified understanding of the
doctrine's function and purpose. While current jurisprudential standards have
adequately defined the crucial issues inherent in the concept of parental
immunity, the continuing viability of the doctrine depends on a refined
understanding of its scope and purpose. Viewing the parent as a discretionary
actor whose authority is circumscribed by limits of scope, context, exercise,
and the standard of the "ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent under similar
circumstances" should significantly enhance this understanding.
Clearly, the standard for assessing parental conduct as proposed by this
Note will not resolve all ambiguities and complications arising from the
application of the parental immunity doctrine. Reasonable minds are sure to
differ as to what acts are within the limits of context, scope, and exercise where
immunity is afforded, and mixed questions of law and fact are certain to arise
in ascertaining those limits. What the standard does promise, however, is a
more clarified understanding of the nature of parental immunity. By applying
an analytical framework which subsumes the numerous issues and elements
arising in the sphere of parental immunity, courts may render decisions which
invoke-or refute-the logic of judicial precedent in a more consistent and
comprehensive fashion. The goals to be realized are not only increased
uniformity and clarity, but the paramount objective of establishing an equitable
balance between the autonomous parent-child relationship and an injured
child's right to legal redress.
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